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The scholarly literature on punishment-its general justification and
allocation, its forms and processes-is vast indeed. The discourse ranges from the
seemingly intractable philosophical debate between retributive and utilitarian
accounts of punishment's legitimate purpose to more practical considerations
involving trials, sentencing, and implementation. We are, in short, preoccupied
with punishment. This is as it should be, for criminal punishment involves what is
perhaps the most profound and awesome exercise of the state's formidable power.
Absent a compelling justification, the sort of hard treatment that constitutes
punishment-the deprivation of life, liberty, or property-would itself represent a
grave injustice, especially in a liberal democratic polity. But for all of the
thoughtful discussion of punishment's many facets, the relationship between
punishment and political theory has received relatively little sustained attention,
especially in legal scholarship.' In some cases this omission reflects an affirmative
rejection of the relevance of political theory to questions of criminal punishment;2
more generally it may reflect a determination to take the Anglo-American political
context as given in order to explore specific legal controversies on their own terms.
While these judgments represent valid scholarly choices, the result is that many of
the most difficult questions about punishment remain under-examined. And as
Claire Finkelstein observes in this volume: "It is the job of legal philosophers to
help import clarity about the structure of our moral values and their degree of
inviolability, with the hope that it will help policy makers face up to their
underlying normative commitments squarely."3
This symposium takes up that challenge, offering fresh perspectives on a
range of familiar issues, with special attention to the interplay between political
theory and criminal punishment. Each contribution takes the question of political
legitimacy as central to the justification of our punitive institutions and practices.
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And although in each case the political context is recognizably liberal, contested
conceptions of core liberal values inform a variety of punitive accounts. Thus, in
his contribution, Expressive Punishment and Political Authority,4 Christopher
Bennett, a proponent of an expressive account of punishment's purpose,s confronts
the question of state authority that lies behind the expressive rationale.
Specifically, he explores the possibility that a commitment to the expressive
justification depends upon an objectionable, possibly illiberal, conception of the
state. Although he concludes that the expressive rationale is compatible with "at
least one attractive form of political community"-a democratic polity-he also
highlights the difficulty of specifying the grounds of democratic authority on
which his appealing conception of expressive punishment depends.
Claire Finkelstein, in Punishment as Contract,7 and Richard Dagger, in Social
Contracts, Fair Play, and the Justification of Punishment,8 take up where Bennett
leaves off. Although both, following John Rawls, conceive of political society as a
"cooperative venture for mutual advantage," 9 Finkelstein defends a version of
classic contract theory as the basis for justified punishment. On this view,
punishment is justified because-and to the extent that-individuals have
effectively consented to it and have derived benefits from the scheme of
cooperation that the institution of punishment makes possible. According to
Dagger, however, the initial appeal of various contract-based accounts of
punishment does not withstand scrutiny because none provides an adequate basis
for the high degree of mutual cooperation essential to the liberal state. Having
elsewhere developed a version of fair-play theory as the foundation of justified
punishment,'o Dagger here argues that it is the implicit appeal to fairness, rather
than consent or benefit, that lends contract approaches whatever plausibility they
have.
Zachary Hoskins, in Deterrent Punishment and Respect for Persons," and
Youngjae Lee, in Deontology, Political Morality, and the State,12 address the
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viability of deterrence as a justification for punishment, responding to some
familiar deontological objections to an instrumentalist account of punishment in a
liberal state. Hoskins maintains that a commitment to deterrence, duly constrained
to avoid certain obvious injustices, can be compatible with the liberal commitment
to respect for persons as autonomous moral agents. In particular, he argues that
pursuing deterrence need not involve treating wrongdoers as outsiders to the
political community or securing compliance through threats rather than the moral
appeal befitting "autonomous members of a liberal political community."l3 For his
part, Lee considers the argument that the state has a moral obligation to pursue
crime prevention more assiduously by, for example, inflicting the death penalty on
a larger number of convicted murderers or relaxing the standards of proof for
criminal liability. After analyzing some standard distinctions in deontological
ethics-and rejecting them as insufficient to meet the challenge-Lee identifies
specific features of the political morality of the liberal state that constrain its
pursuit of crime control. For the "fundamental legal protections that are promised
to individuals ... spell out the proper relationship between the government and the
governed, and they are among the many conditions that attach to the government's
exclusive possession and use of the power to criminalize and punish."l 4
Finally, in my own contribution, The Political Morality of the Eighth
Amendment,15 I develop a critique of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence that faults the Court for adopting a form of moral skepticism that is
at odds with our constitutional values. In place of the majoritarianism that
dominates its current approach to determining what counts as cruel and unusual
punishment, I argue that the Court should develop a conception of decent treatment
grounded in our political morality. In this way, the essay reflects the shared
premise of all of the contributions-that the best account of punishment, whatever
it turns out to be, should engage rather than obscure the political commitments and
values that structure the institution of criminal punishment.
13 Hoskins, supra note 11, at 382.
14 Lee, supra note 12, at 399.
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(2011).
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